Reconstruction of falsified computer logs for digital forensics investigations by Tang, Maolin & Fidge, Colin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
This is the accepted version of this conference paper:
Tang, Maolin and Fidge, Colin J. (2010) Reconstruction of falsified 
computer logs for digital forensics investigations. In: Proceedings of 
the 8th Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2010), 18‐
21 January 2010, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 
Queensland. 
© Copyright 2010 Australian Computer Society and the authors 
Reconstruction of Falsified Computer Logs
for Digital Forensics Investigations
Maolin Tang Colin Fidge
Faculty of Science and Technology
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
Email: {m.tang, c.fidge}@qut.edu.au
Abstract
Digital forensics investigations aim to find evidence
that helps confirm or disprove a hypothesis about
an alleged computer-based crime. However, the
ease with which computer-literate criminals can fal-
sify computer event logs makes the prosecutor’s job
highly challenging. Given a log which is suspected
to have been falsified or tampered with, a prosecu-
tor is obliged to provide a convincing explanation for
how the log may have been created. Here we focus
on showing how a suspect computer event log can be
transformed into a hypothesised actual sequence of
events, consistent with independent, trusted sources
of event orderings. We present two algorithms which
allow the effort involved in falsifying logs to be quan-
tified, as a function of the number of ‘moves’ required
to transform the suspect log into the hypothesised
one, thus allowing a prosecutor to assess the likeli-
hood of a particular falsification scenario. The first
algorithm always produces an optimal solution but,
for reasons of efficiency, is suitable for short event logs
only. To deal with the massive amount of data typi-
cally found in computer event logs, we also present a
second heuristic algorithm which is considerably more
efficient but may not always generate an optimal out-
come.
Keywords: Digital forensics, computer logs, event cor-
relation algorithms.
1 Introduction
Digital forensics involves investigations into sus-
pected crimes or misbehaviors that are manifested
in computer-based evidence (Richard III & Roussev
2006). Part of this process is showing that sequences
of events hypothesised by a forensic investigator or
legal prosecutor are consistent with the available dig-
ital evidence (Mohay 2005). If the integrity of the evi-
dence, typically computer-generated logs, is in doubt,
then the assumed actual sequence of events needs to
be reconstructed, and its relationship to the digital
artifacts needs to be explained in terms of actions
that could reasonably have been performed by the
defendant.
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Digital forensics has three major phases: acqui-
sition, analysis and presentation (Carrier 2002). In
the acquisition phase the state of a digital system
is preserved so that it can be analysed later. Tools
used in the acquisition phase are programs that can
copy data and software from a suspect storage device
to a trusted one. In the analysis phase, the acquired
data is examined in order to find pieces of evidence to
support or contradict a given hypothesis intended to
explain how the evidence was created. In the presen-
tation phase the conclusions from the analysis phase
are presented in a legal setting in a way comprehen-
sible to non-experts. Here we are concerned with the
analysis phase, especially the process of explaining
how deliberately falsified computer log evidence may
have been created.
Analyses of computer logs usually rely on time-
stamps to determine the order in which events oc-
curred. However, the clocks used to generate time-
stamps may be inaccurate when compared to ‘abso-
lute’ time (Schatz et al. 2006). Even worse, computer-
literate criminals may attempt to cover their tracks
by adjusting the clocks on their computers to create
misleading event logs (Willassen 2008a).
To overcome this, we need to know whether or not
an acquired event log may have been falsified and,
if so, how this could have been done. To some ex-
tent this problem can be approached by comparing
the suspect event log with independently-generated,
trusted event logs. The difficulty, however, is that
event logs produced by different sources, e.g., com-
puter operating systems, door swipecard readers,
network firewalls, network routers, Internet Service
Providers, web servers, etc, contain records of dif-
ferent kinds of events. Determining the relationship
between these events, and even finding a common rep-
resentation for them, can be highly challenging (Chen
et al. 2003).
Previous work has focussed on determining which
trusted, causally-related event orderings are consis-
tent with the timestamped evidence, according to a
particular falsification hypothesis (Willassen 2008b).
However, the problem of reconstructing hypothesised
event sequences from the available digital evidence
has received relatively little attention.
In this paper we consider the problem of determin-
ing how a suspect event log may have been created, in
the context of a sequence of events hypothesised from
independent, trusted sources of information. This
outcome allows a prosecutor to assess the likelihood
of different assumed actions by the defendant. A pro-
posed scenario which involves relatively little effort on
the part of a suspected criminal is more likely than
one which requires a large number of actions in order
to produce the presumably-falsified computer log.
We present two algorithms for quantifying the
number of steps required to turn a prosecutor’s hy-
pothesised sequence of actual events into the sequence
of events found in a seized computer’s log. The first
algorithm always produces an optimal result, in the
sense that it completes the transformation in the
fewest steps. However, because computer forensics
typically involves analysing massive amounts of data
(Mohay 2005), we also present a heuristic algorithm
which is considerably more efficient but may not yield
an optimal answer. Nevertheless, for the purposes of
arguing a legal case, a sub-optimal solution will often
suffice.
2 Previous and Related Work
Much work has already been done on the problem of
how to analyse and ‘correlate’ events found in differ-
ent data logs, but in general this work differs from
ours because it does not consider the possibility of
reordering the events in a suspect log to match a par-
ticular hypothesis.
Broadly speaking, the legal importance of com-
puter logs is illustrated by the emergence of standards
for their maintenance. For instance, Kent & Soup-
paya (2006) present general guidelines for responsi-
ble management of computer security logs, including
storage, data formats, data integrity, data confiden-
tiality, etc.
Numerous tools have been proposed to help foren-
sic investigators process the large amounts of data
produced by computer-based systems. Case et al.
(2008) note that existing forensics tools provide iso-
lated data mining functions but leave the job of inter-
preting and correlating the data to the human inves-
tigator. They present a prototype environment for
integrating and correlating timestamped events ob-
tained from several different data logs into a single
sequence. To do this they rely on the timestamps
in login files and network traces to reconstruct the
actions performed by a user during a particular ses-
sion. They do not, however, consider the possibility
that the ordering implied by the timestamps is not
the actual one.
Similarly, Best et al. (2004) devised a tool for
analysis of operating system logs to help secu-
rity auditors mine the generated data. The tool
searches for attempts to circumvent security mech-
anisms and changes in users’ behaviour, as compared
to previously-accumulated user profiles. More re-
cently, Raghavan et al. (2009) proposed a software
architecture for integrating forensic data from mul-
tiple sources that allows an investigator to explore
theories about past behaviours, but again it does not
consider the possibility of event reordering.
Since forensic evidence often relates to causal re-
lationships between events, much previous work has
focussed on detecting causal relationships across dif-
ferent logs. For instance, in the context of distributed
systems, Gazagnaire & He´loue¨t (2007) considered the
problem of knowing whether or not two events in dif-
ferent logs are causally related. Since logged data is
typically incomplete with respect to event causality,
they developed a theory for composition of partially-
ordered event sets that do not include all causal re-
lationships between events. Their ‘event correlation’
theory allows missing causal relationships to be re-
constructed. However, they assumed that the causal
relationships present in the given logs are correct, un-
like our situation.
In a related vein, Schatz et al. (2004) focussed on
the semantic content of event logs, so that domain-
specific inferences can be drawn about possible hy-
potheses using data other than that which is obvi-
ously security-related. They used pattern-based rea-
soning rules to correlate logged events so that causal
relationships between events can be identified. They
subsequently extended this work so that the reason-
ing rules could infer information from multiple het-
erogenous domains, e.g., firewall logs and swipecard
access logs (Schatz et al. 2005). The motivation for
this work is similar to our own, but again they assume
that the ordering of events in the individual logs be-
ing correlated is accurate, and make no allowance for
deliberate falsification of event orderings.
In practice, the causal ordering of logged events is
assumed to be determined by their associated time-
stamps, so many studies have focussed on the ac-
curacy of timestamping mechanisms. For instance,
Boyd & Forster (2004) noted that analysis of time-
stamped events can be complex due to different date-
time data formats and time zones. They cite a crimi-
nal case in which the defence asserted that police had
falsified evidence by adding files to the defendant’s
computer after it had been seized. Ultimately it tran-
spired that this was not the case—the defence’s ex-
pert witness had, in fact, misinterpreted the ordering
of events by failing to include a necessary timezone-
related offset to the timestamps.
Gladyshev & Patel (2005) presented a formal-
isation of the problem of placing bounds on the
range of times within which a non-timestamped event
could have occurred, by ‘sandwiching’ it between two
causally-related timestamped events.
Willassen (2008b) treated the problem of inaccu-
rate timestamps as the need to test a ‘clock hypoth-
esis’ against the timestamped evidence. The aim
of this work was to determine which causal action
sequences are possible, given the hypothesised be-
haviour of the clock used to generate the timestamps.
This work was then extended so that it could be used
to detect ‘antedating’, i.e., deliberate falsification of
timestamps, by detecting that the timestamps on
events are inconsistent with (known) necessary causal
orderings (Willassen 2008a). This work is highly rel-
evant to our own, but its aim was to detect mis-
matches between actual and timestamped event se-
quences, whereas we are concerned with how to trans-
form one to the other.
Similarly, Schatz et al. (2006) considered the prob-
lem of correlating timestamped events when the
clocks used to generate the timestamps differ from
absolute time due to inadvertent clock skew or drift,
or deliberate clock tampering. They present the re-
sults of empirical experiments for measuring the offset
of the timestamping clock from a trusted reference
clock in order to determine the likely offset in the
timestamps. Again, however, the way in which ac-
tual and timestamped event orderings can be linked
was not the primary focus of their work.
Finally, to a certain extent, the algorithms we de-
velop below are related to the classic ‘marriage prob-
lem’, in which the most efficient pairing of elements
from two disjoint sets must be found. This well-
known combinatorial challenge is usually solved via
a backtracking algorithm (Berman & Paul 2005). It
differs from our problem, however, because there is
no concept of an overall ordering in the two sets of
elements.
3 Problem Statement
Consider the problem faced by a prosecutor intent on
showing that acquired evidence is consistent with a
particular hypothesis concerning criminal behaviour,
even in the face of deliberate falsification of the evi-
dence. In the case of digital data this usually means
attempting to reconcile a hypothesis formed from
trusted information, such as the logs generated by
an Internet Service Provider, with non-trustworthy
information, such as the file and event timestamps on
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Figure 1: Example computer log and ISP log correlation model
the personal computer owned by the accused (Schatz
et al. 2006).
For example, the correlation between the events
in a computer log and the events in a corresponding
ISP log can be modelled as a bigraph G = (U ∪V,E),
where V is the computer event set, containing all
the events in the potentially-compromised computer’s
logs, and U is the ISP event set, containing all rele-
vant events in the trustworthy ISP’s event logs. An
edge (u, v) is in E if event v ∈ V is correlated to event
u ∈ U , or if event v ∈ U is correlated to event u ∈ V .
Each event in the ISP’s event log may be related
to multiple events in the computer’s activity log. For
example, an event in the ISP log may be a visit to a
particular website from the defendant’s personal com-
puter. While visiting the website, however, multi-
ple individual files may have been downloaded to the
computer. Thus, in the computer log there will be
multiple download events, while the ISP log records
only a single website visit.
Figure 1 illustrates such a computer log and ISP
log correlation model. In this case there are four
events recorded in the ISP’s log, u1, u2, u3 and u4,
but there are twelve events in the personal computer’s
log, v1, v2, · · ·, v12. Events v1, v3 and v4 recorded in
the computer’s log are correlated to event u1 in the
ISP’s log; events v2 and v5 in the computer’s log are
related to event u2 in the ISP’s log; events v7 and v8
in the computer’s log are related to event u3 in the
ISP’s log; and events v9 and v11 in the computer’s log
are related to event u4 in the ISP’s log. Computer log
events v6, v10 and v12 are generated by local actions
that did not involve Internet access, so they have no
correspondence to any ISP events.
We assume the events in the ISP’s log were all
timestamped, in a way accurately reflecting the order
in which Internet-related events actually occurred.
This ordering can be modeled by a directed graph
GU = (VU , EU ), where VU = U is the set of ISP
events, and (ui, uj) ∈ EU if ui and uj were two con-
secutive events in the ISP’s log. We call directed
graph GU the ISP event constraint graph. For in-
stance, assume the events in the ISP’s log in Figure 1
have timestamps corresponding to the sequence u3,
u2, u1 and u4. Then the ISP event constraint graph
is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Example ISP event constraint graph
An event in the ISP’s event log may be corre-
lated to multiple events in the corresponding com-
puter event log and there may be reasonableness con-
straints between the events. For example, a computer
file must be created before it can be accessed or mod-
ified. Thus, a file creation event must occur before an
access or modification event for the same file. Such
constraints can be represented by a computer event
constraint graph GV = (VV , EV ), where VV = V is
the computer event set, and (vi, vj) ∈ EV if event vi
must occur before event vj . Figure 3 is an instance
of the computer event constraint graph for the set of
computer events shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Example computer event constraint graph
All of the information in Figures 1, 2 and 3 can be
used by a prosecutor to form a hypothesis about the
actual sequence of events that must have occurred in
some criminal case. If the log of events recorded on
the defendant’s computer is inconsistent with these
independent sources of information, we are obliged to
find an explanation for how the presumably-falsified
log could have been created. This is the motivation
for our research.
It is assumed that all the events in the computer
event log were timestamped. We define a computer
event log as a sequence of recorded events ordered
by their timestamps. Such a log is considered to
be ‘falsified’ if the timestamped event sequence vi-
olates any of the event orderings implied by indepen-
dent information sources such as those in Figures 1, 2
and 3. For example, the timestamped event sequence
〈v1, v9, v2, v4, v3, v5, v6, v7, v8, v10, v11, v12〉 is falsified
because it violates the constraint that event v3 must
occur before event v4 in Figure 3, and the require-
ment that v5 comes before v9 as required by Figures 1
and 2.
When someone attempts to disguise their actions
by falsifying a computer log, this is often done by
resetting the clock on their computer to alter the ap-
parent order in which certain actions were actually
performed, and by then setting the clock back again
to hide the fact that any such subterfuge has been
attempted (Willassen 2008a). This has the effect of
causing a consecutive sequence of events to be given
misleading timestamps. If the timestamps on events
are used to infer the assumed event ordering, the out-
come is that the whole sequence of events performed
while the computer’s clock was maladjusted will ap-
pear in the wrong place in the overall event history.
In effect, this mechanism can be used by malefactors
to “move” sequences of events in the log.
Given the suspicion that such a deception has
taken place, we assume that a forensic investigator (or
criminal prosecutor) has a hypothesis in mind about
the actual sequence of events, typically informed by
independent sources of information such as ISP logs.
Our technical goal, therefore, given a purportedly-
falsified computer event log, and the forensic inves-
tigator’s hypothesised computer event log, is to as-
sess the reasonableness of the forensic investigator’s
hypothesis by showing how the hypothesised log can
be transformed into the falsified one in the smallest
number of moves.
4 Our Approach
This section presents two algorithms for the falsified
computer event log reconstruction problem, an opti-
mal algorithm for analysing relatively small data sets,
and a heuristic algorithm for large data sets. The lat-
ter is necessary in practice because the problem of
reconstructing event logs is a combinatorial optimi-
sation problem and the search space of the optimal
algorithm has a super-linear order of growth.
4.1 Definitions
Before presenting the algorithms themselves, we in-
troduce some definitions used in the rest of the paper.
A consecutive event sequence is a sequence of
events in a falsified computer event log that occur
consecutively in the corresponding hypothesised com-
puter event log. A maximal consecutive event se-
quence is a consecutive event sequence that is not
covered by any other consecutive event sequence. For
example, let S = v4v5v1v2v3 be a falsified computer
event log and S∗ = v1v2v3v4v5 be the hypothesised
computer event log. Then, 〈v1〉, 〈v1v2〉 and 〈v1v2v3〉
are three consecutive event sequences in S. But only
the consecutive sequence 〈v1v2v3〉 is a maximal con-
secutive computer event sequence. There are two
maximal consecutive event sequences in S, 〈v1v2v3〉
and 〈v4v5〉.
In order to facilitate the presentation, we assume
that the computer events in a hypothesised computer
event log are in sequential order according to their
subscripts, without loss of generality. Thus, a maxi-
mal consecutive computer event sequence in S must
be of the form 〈vivi+1 · · · vj〉 and is denoted as vi−j
in the rest of this paper, where i ≤ j.
A falsified computer event log can be represented
by a sequence of maximal consecutive event se-
quences. For example, S = v4v5v1v2v3 can be rep-
resented as v4−5v1−3.
4.2 Finding Maximal Consecutive Event Se-
quences
To start our analysis we first partition the falsified
event sequence S into a sequence of maximal consec-
utive event sequences, so that these entire sequences
can be ‘moved’ as a single unit. This is necessary since
a single adjustment to a computer’s clock will effec-
tively shift an entire sequence of subsequent events in
the log. However, we do not want to consider each of
Algorithm 1 Transform a computer event sequence
into a sequence of maximal consecutive event se-
quences
Require: A computer event sequence S = v1v2 · · ·
vn, and its corresponding hypothesised computer
event sequence S∗ = v∗1v
∗
2 · · · v∗n;
Ensure: The maximal consecutive event sequence
representation of S.
i = 1;
seqs = ∅;
while i ≤ n do
Find the maximal consecutive event sequence in
S starting from the ith computer event using Al-
gorithm 2;
i = i + the length of the maximal consecutive
event sequence;
seqs = seqs+ the maximal consecutive event se-
quence;
end while;
return seqs.
the events individually, as this would give a mislead-
ing impression about the ‘effort’ required to falsify
the log.
Algorithm 1 transforms a computer event sequence
into a sequence of maximal consecutive event se-
quences. Firstly, it finds the maximal consecutive
computer event sequence in S starting from S’s first
event, then finds the next maximal consecutive com-
puter event sequence starting from the end of the
maximal sequence, and so on. The process of find-
ing the next maximal consecutive computer event se-
quence is repeated until all maximal consecutive com-
puter event sequences are found. The maximal con-
secutive computer event sequences are concatenated
to form a sequence of maximal consecutive computer
event sequences.
Algorithm 2 finds a maximal consecutive com-
puter event sequence in S, starting from a particu-
lar event vi, and is used as an auxiliary subroutine
by Algorithm 1. It first searches through S∗ for the
starting event vi, and then accumulates events as long
as those in S and S∗ match.
Algorithm 2 Find a maximal consecutive event se-
quence
Require: A computer event sequence S = v1v2 · · ·
vn, its corresponding hypothesised computer event
sequence S∗ = v∗1v
∗
2 · · · v∗n, and a starting location i;
Ensure: A maximal consecutive event sequence
starting from location i.
j = 1;
while vi 6= v∗j do
j = j + 1;
end while;
start location = j;
repeat
i = i + 1;
j = j + 1;
until vi 6= v∗j ;
end location = j − 1;
return vstart location−end location.
It is straightforward to show that the computa-
tional complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n×m), where
n is the number of computer events in S and m is
the number of maximal consecutive computer event
sequences in S. Algorithm 2 takes O(n) time to find
the location of event vi in S∗ and O(n) time to find
the maximal computer event sequence starting from
this event, so the computational complexity of Algo-
rithm 2 is O(n). Assume that S contains m maximal
consecutive computer event sequences. Then Algo-
rithm 1 invokes Algorithm 2 m times. Thus, the com-
putational complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n×m).
4.3 An Optimal Algorithm for Determining
the Moves Required to Falsify a Log
This section presents an algorithm guaranteed to find
the optimal solution to the problem of how a com-
puter log could have been falsified, where optimality
is defined as transforming the hypothesised log into
the presumably-falsified one in the minimal number
of moves. Each ‘move’ involves shifting an entire se-
quence of events and, in practice, is the consequence
of resetting the computer’s clock to disguise the true
sequence of events.
The algorithm is basically an A∗ algorithm (Hart
et al. 1968). An A∗ algorithm is a best-first graph
searching algorithm that finds the shortest path from
a given source node s to a goal node t in the graph. It
uses a heuristic function, f(x), to determine the or-
der in which to visit nodes in the graph. The heuris-
tic function is a sum of two subfunctions: a distance
function, g(x), which is the distance from the source
node s to current node x, and an admissible “heuris-
tic estimate” h(x) of the distance from node x to goal
node t. Function h(x) must be an admissible heuris-
tic, that is, it must not overestimate the distance from
x to t in order to guarantee the admissibility and op-
timality of the A∗ algorithm (Hart et al. 1968).
The evaluation function used by our A∗ algorithm
is defined by Equation 1 below.
f(x) = g(x) + h(x) (1)
Here g(x) is the actual distance (the number of
moves) from s to x, and h(x) is defined by Equation 2.
h(x) = d(m− 1)/3e (2)
Here m stands for the number of maximal consecutive
event sequences in x and dm/3e is the smallest integer
greater than or equal to m/3. Function h(x) is an
admissible heuristic estimate of the distance, i.e., the
number of moves, from x to t because the number of
moves from x to t is greater than or equal to dm/3e−1
(see Section 4.4).
Algorithm 3 is our A∗ search algorithm and Al-
gorithm 4 is an auxiliary algorithm for backtracking
and generating output.
In the A∗ algorithm, four data structures are used.
The first is OpenSet, which is a set that stores com-
puter event logs that are at the frontier of the A∗
search. The second is ClosedSet, which keeps com-
puter event logs that have been visited. The third
is came from[x], which is used to store the parent
computer event log sequence of x. For example, if
came from[x] = y, then it indicates that y was ob-
tained by moving a maximal computer event sequence
in x. The fourth is moves[y], which is used to store
how y was obtained. Specifically, moves[y] contains
a maximal computer sequence and the location of the
maximal computer sequence in its parent. For ex-
ample, moves[y] = [vi−j , from, to] indicates that the
parent computer event log of y can be built by moving
the maximal consecutive event sequence vi−j from lo-
cation from to location to in y. Note that locations
from and to are those in the original computer event
log, rather than the locations in the maximal consec-
utive event sequence.
Consider a simple example to illustrate how the
A∗ search algorithm works. Let the hypothesised
event sequence be S∗ = v1v2v3v4v5v6v7v8 and the
falsified one be S = v3v4v5v7v8v6v1v2. First of all,
Algorithm 3 A∗ search
Require: A falsified sequence of computer events S,
and a hypothesised computer event log S∗;
Ensure: A sequence of moves for transforming S∗
into S.
Transform S into a sequence of maximal consecu-
tive computer event sequences using Algorithm 1;
m = the number of maximal consecutive events
in S;
for i = 1, m do
came from[i] = null;
moves[i] = null;
end for;
ClosedSet = ∅;
OpenSet = {S};
g(S) = 0;
h(S) = d(m − 1)/3e, where m is the number of
maximal consecutive event sequences in S;
f(S) = g(S) + h(S);
while OpenSet 6= ∅ do
x = the element in OpenSet that has the least
f(x) = g(x) + h(x) and contains the minimal
number of maximal consecutive event sequences
(if there is more than one element that satisfies
the conditions, then the one that was added to
OpenSet first is selected);
Remove x from OpenSet;
Add x to ClosedSet;
m = the number of maximal consecutive com-
puter event sequences in x;
if m = 1 then
Use Algorithm 4 to backtrack and output the
sequence of moves from S∗ to S, and then stop.
end if ;
for each y that can be obtained by moving a
maximal consecutive computer event sequence
from location i to location j, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m
do
if y /∈ ClosedSet then
new g(y) = g(x) + 1;
came from[y] = x;
moves[y] = [x, i, j];
if y /∈ OpenSet then
Add y to OpenSet;
g(y) = new g(y);
h(y) = d(m − 1)/3e, where m is the
number of maximal consecutive event se-
quences in y;
f(y) = g(y) + h(y);
else
if new g(y) < g(y) then
g(y) = new g(y);
end if
end if
end if
end for
end while
Algorithm 4 Backtracking moves
Require: A hypothesis computer event sequence S∗,
a falsified computer event sequence S, and values
came from and moves generated by the search al-
gorithms;
Ensure: A sequence of moves that transform a hy-
pothesised computer event sequence S∗ to a falsi-
fied computer event sequence S.
x = S∗;
y = came from[x];
while y 6= null do
print moves[x];
x = y;
y = came from[x];
end while
the A∗ search algorithm transforms S into a sequence
of maximal consecutive computer event sequences
v3−5v7−8v6−6v1−2. The number of maximal consecu-
tive computer event sequences is m = 4.
After initializing variables came from[i],
moves[i], ClosedSet and OpenSet, the A∗ search
algorithm explores all the neighbours of S. A
neighbour of S is defined as a computer event log
that can be obtained by moving a maximal consec-
utive computer event sequence from one location to
another in S. After initialisation, OpenSet = {S}
and ClosedSet = ∅, and f(S) is calculated.
In the first exploration, the A∗ search algorithm se-
lects S to explore as it is the only element in OpenSet
and moves it from OpenSet to ClosedSet. Then, all
neighbours of S are added to OpenSet as none of
them is in OpenSet or ClosedSet, all the f values of
the neighbours are updated, and all the came from
and moves elements are updated as well. The search
space after this exploration is shown in Figure 4.
After the first exploration, ClosedSet equals {S}
and OpenSet is {v7−8v3−6v1−2, v7−8v6−6v3−5v1−2,
v7−8v6−6v1−5, v3−8v1−2, v3−6v1−2v7−8,
v6−6v3−5v7−8v1−2, v3−5v7−8v1−2v6−6, v1−5v7−8v6−6,
v3−5v1−2v7−8v6−6}.
S
V3-5V7-8V6-6V1-2
V7-8V6-6V3-5V1-2
V7-8V3-6V1-2
V7-8V6-6V1-5
V3-8V1-2
V3-6V1-2V7-8
V6-6V3-5V7-8V1-2
V3-5V7-8V1-2V6-6
V1-5V7-8V6-6
V3-5V1-2V7-8V6-6
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f=2
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Figure 4: The A∗ search space after exploring S
In the second exploration, the A∗ search algorithm
selects v3−8v1−2 to explore as it has the minimal f
value and contains a minimal number of maximal
consecutive event sequences. The algorithm moves
v3−8v1−2 from OpenSet to ClosedSet. Then, v1−8 =
S∗ is added to OpenSet as v1−8 is the only neighbour
of v3−8v1−2 that is not in OpenSet or ClosedSet, the
f value of v1−8 is calculated, and the came from and
moves elements are updated as well. The search space
after this exploration is shown in Figure 5.
After the second exploration, ClosedSet equals
{S, v3−8v1−2} and OpenSet equals {v7−8v3−6v1−2,
v7−8v6−6v3−5v1−2, v7−8v6−6v1−5, v3−6v1−2v7−8,
v6−6v3−5v7−8v1−2, v3−5v7−8v1−2v6−6, v1−5v7−8v6−6,
v3−5v1−2v7−8v6−6, v1−8}.
In the third exploration, the A∗ search algorithm
selects sequence v1−8 to visit. Since m = 1, the
A∗ search algorithm has found the goal. After the
goal computer event log is found, the backtrack-
ing algorithm is used to retrieve the path from S∗
to S. This path is then the optimal sequence of
moves, [v3−8, 3, 1] followed by [v7−8, 5, 4]. In other
words, event sequence v1v2v3v4v5v6v7v8 can be trans-
formed into event sequence v3v4v5v7v8v6v1v2 in only
two ‘moves’, highlighting the fact that this seemingly
complex rearrangement of events does not take a ma-
jor effort. In a criminal case this observation may be
crucial in making the prosecutor’s case convincing.
4.4 A Heuristic Algorithm for Determining
the Moves Required to Falsify a Log
The A∗ algorithm can always find an optimal solu-
tion, i.e., a minimal sequence of moves that transform
a hypothesised computer event log into a falsified one.
Unfortunately, A∗ algorithms are notoriously expen-
sive. Their time complexity ranges from polynomial
to exponential, depending on the heuristic function
used, and their space complexity is often exponential.
Given the large number of events in actual computer
logs, the algorithm in Section 4.3 will often prove im-
practical.
Therefore, this section presents a heuristic algo-
rithm that is more efficient. Although it will always
find a solution, it cannot be guaranteed to find the
optimal one. Nevertheless, by making use of some
contextual information, the heuristic algorithm will
usually find a solution involving a small number of
moves. Furthermore, in the context of a legal ar-
gument about the likelihood of a crime having been
committed, finding a mathematically optimal solu-
tion may not be necessary.
Like the A∗ algorithm, it is assumed that a fal-
sified computer event log was created by repeatedly
moving one consecutive computer event sequence at
a time from one location to another. In order to min-
imise the number of moves, we assume that whenever
a consecutive computer event sequence is moved, it
has to be a maximal consecutive computer event se-
quence. The algorithm’s input again includes a fal-
sified computer event log S and a hypothesised com-
puter event log S∗. The output of the algorithm is a
sequence of moves of maximal consecutive computer
event sequences that transforms S∗ into S.
The heuristic algorithm treats the log reconstruc-
tion problem as one of finding a shortest path in
a state space. Each state in the state space repre-
sents a computer event sequence that can be trans-
formed from S by moving some maximal consecutive
computer event sequences in S in a particular order.
Once the path is found, the heuristic algorithm back-
tracks along the shortest path, which represents the
sequence of moves of maximal consecutive computer
event sequences, using the same backtracking proce-
dure used by the A∗ algorithm.
Algorithm 5 is our heuristic algorithm for the falsi-
fied computer event log reconstruction problem. The
search process is iterative. In each iteration the algo-
rithm explores all the new computer event sequences
that can be obtained by moving one of the maximal
consecutive event sequences in S and chooses the new
computer event sequence that contains the minimal
number of maximal consecutive event sequences. By
so doing it minimizes the number of moves from the
falsified computer event sequence to the hypothesis
computer event sequence.
There are two operations that are used frequently
in the heuristic algorithm. One is to update the max-
imal consecutive event sequence in a temporary falsi-
fied computer event sequence S1 and the other is to
update the number of maximal consecutive computer
event sequences in S1. To do this we merely need to
perform two major steps.
Assume that a maximal consecutive computer
event sequence is being moved from location i to lo-
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Figure 6: The search space of the heuristic algorithm
cation j in S1. We check if the maximal consecutive
computer event sequences ending at locations i − 1
and i+ 1 can be merged to form a new maximal con-
secutive computer event sequence, where i + 1 ≤ m1
and m1 is the number of maximal consecutive com-
puter event sequences in S1. This handles the situa-
tion where moving a maximal event sequence allows
the sequences that surrounded it in its old location
to be conjoined to create a new maximal consecu-
tive sequence. If so, then they are merged to form a
new maximal sequence, and we decrease the number
of maximal consecutive computer event sequences by
one.
Similarly, we further check whether or not moving
a sequence to a new location allows it to be conjoined
at one or both ends with its new neighbours to create
an even longer maximal sequence. In other words,
we want to know if the newly-moved sequence can be
merged into a single maximal consecutive computer
event sequences at both new locations j−1 and j+1,
where j < m1 and m1 is the number of maximal
consecutive computer event sequences in S1. If so,
we merge them and reduce the number of maximal
consecutive computer event sequences by two. How-
ever, if the moved maximal sequence can be conjoined
with its new neighbours at just one end, i.e., at loca-
tion j − 1 or j + 1, we perform the merge and reduce
the number of maximal consecutive computer event
sequences by one.
Figure 7 shows an example of sequence concatena-
V15-15  V9-10  V3-4  V11-12  V16-18  V1-2  V5-8  V19-19
1            2           3           4            5            6          7          8
(a)
V15-15  V9-10  V11-12  V16-18  V1-2  V3-4  V5-8  V19-19
(b)
V15-15  V9-12  V16-18  V1-8   V19-19
(c)
Figure 7: An example of sequence concatenation
when moving a sequence
tion. In the example, maximal consecutive sequence
v3−4 is being moved from location 3 to location 7
in S1 = v15−15v9−10v3−4v11−12v16−18v1−2v5−8v19−19.
Figure 7(a) is the state of S1 before the move; Fig-
ure 7(b) shows the intermediate state of S1 after
v3−4 has been moved from location 3 to location 7
but before sequence concatenation is performed; Fig-
ure 7(c) displays the state of S1 after sequence con-
catenation is done. Once sequence v3−4 is moved
from between them, maximal consecutive sequences
v9−10 and v11−12 become adjacent in S1 and are
merged to form a longer maximal consecutive se-
quence v9−12. Also when maximal consecutive se-
quence v3−4 is placed between v1−2 and v5−8, all three
are merged to form a new maximal consecutive se-
quence v1−8. The total number of maximal consecu-
tive sequences in S1 is thus reduced by three in this
case.
Theorem 1 Algorithm 5 can always find a feasible
solution that moves maximal consecutive event se-
quences between d(m−1)/3e and m−1 times, where m
is the number of maximal consecutive event sequences
in a falsified computer event sequence.
Proof. Assume that a maximal consecutive computer
event sequence is being moved from location i to lo-
cation j in S1. In the best case, when the maximal
consecutive computer event sequences at the original
locations i−1 and i+ 1 can be merged to form a new
maximal consecutive computer event sequence and
the maximal consecutive computer event sequence at
new location j − 1, the newly-moved sequence, and
the event sequence at new location j + 1 can all be
merged to form a new maximal consecutive computer
event sequence, the number of maximal consecutive
computer event sequences in S will be reduced by a
total of three. Since there are m maximal consecu-
tive event sequences in S initially, it may thus take
as few as d(m− 1)/3e moves to reduce the number of
maximal consecutive event to one.
In the worst case, when the maximal consecutive
computer event sequence being moved can be merged
only with either the maximal consecutive computer
event at location j − 1 or the one at location j + 1,
the number of maximal consecutive computer event
sequences will be reduced by one only. Since there are
m maximal consecutive event sequences in S initially,
it may thus take at most m − 1 moves to reduce the
number of maximal consecutive sequences to one.
In the following we use a simple example to illus-
trate how the heuristic algorithm works. The pro-
cess is shown in Figure 6. In this example, S∗ =
Algorithm 5 A heuristic algorithm for the falsified
computer event log reconstruction problem
Require: A falsified sequence of computer events S,
and a hypothesised sequence of computer events
S∗;
Ensure: A sequence of moves that transforms S∗
into S.
Transform S into a sequence of maximal consecu-
tive event sequences using Algorithm 1;
m = the number of maximal consecutive events
in S;
for i = 1, m do
came from[i] = null;
moves[i] = null;
end for;
while m > 1 do
S2 = S;
m2 = m;
for i = 1,m do
for j = 1,m do
S1 = S;
Move the ith maximal consecutive event se-
quence in S1 from location i to location j;
Update the maximal consecutive computer
event sequences in S1 and the number of
maximal consecutive event sequences in S1,
m1;
if m1 < m2 then
S2 = S1;
m2 = m1;
from = i;
to = j;
end if
end for
end for
came from[S2] = S;
moves[S2] = [S, from, to];
S = S2;
m = m2;
end while;
Backtrack the moves from S∗ to S using Algo-
rithm 4.
v1v2v3v4v5v6v7v8 and S = v3v4v5v7v8v6v1v2. First
of all, the heuristic algorithm transforms S into a
sequence of maximal consecutive computer event se-
quences v3−5v7−8v6−6v1−2. The number of maximal
consecutive computer event sequences m = 4.
The heuristic algorithm explores all the sequences
that can be obtained by moving one of the maximal
consecutive sequences in S from one location to an-
other, to see which of them produces the minimal
number of maximal consecutive computer event se-
quences. Since v3−8v1−2 is the one that has mini-
mal number of maximal consecutive computer event
sequences, in this case two, the search moves from
S = v3−5v7−8v6−6v1−2 to v3−8v1−2.
The heuristic algorithm then similarly explores all
the state-space neighbours of v3−8v1−2. In this case
v3−8v1−2 has only one neighbour v1−8 and the num-
ber of maximal consecutive computer event sequences
in v1−8 is one, so the search process terminates. Then
the backtracking algorithm backtracks along the path
from S∗ to S. As a result, the sequence of moves
[v3−8, 3, 1] and [v7−8, 5, 4] is obtained.
In this particular case the heuristic algorithm finds
the same two-move solution as the optimal one. Al-
though this may not always be the case in general, the
heuristic algorithm will always find a solution, and
this will typically be one involving a small number of
steps thanks to the process of conjoining maximal se-
quences into even longer ones whenever possible dur-
ing an iteration of the algorithm. More importantly,
the heuristic algorithm can be applied to larger data
sets than the optimal one, in general.
This is because the A∗ algorithm is a global op-
timal search algorithm. In the best case it may find
a globally-optimal solution by exploring only a small
part of the potential search space, but in the worst
case it will be forced to explore all the alternatives
in which an optimal solution may exist. By contrast,
the heuristic algorithm is a local search algorithm. It
explores only one local optimum area and converges
to its local optimum (which may or may not be a
global optimum). Therefore, even though it is possi-
ble for the A∗ algorithm to outperform the heuristic
algorithm in particular cases, i.e., when the A∗ algo-
rithm is lucky enough to find a globally-optimal so-
lution in a small search area early, and the heuristic
algorithm is forced to explore a large locally-optimal
search space, this will not be true in general. For
large data sets with multiple local optimums, the A∗
algorithm’s average performance will be significantly
worse than that of the heuristic algorithm.
5 Conclusion
Analysing computer forensic evidence is highly chal-
lenging. We have presented two algorithms for de-
termining how a falsified computer log can be related
to a hypothesised sequence of events, in terms of the
effort required to transform one into the other. This
gives us a sound basis for arguing about the likeli-
hood of someone deliberately disguising their actions
by tampering with computer logs, e.g., by adjusting
the clock on their personal computer.
In future work we will perform empirical studies
showing how the approach works in practice on actual
large-scale computer logs. In addition, we will inves-
tigate how to construct the hypothesised computer
event log using data from multiple trusted sources.
In real life there may be many ways to obtain event
logs, from timestamps on computer files, to logs on
web servers, to logs of swipe card accesses on doors.
A major unresolved challenge is to match an assumed
“scenario” with all of these logs simultaneously.
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